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Comments
ROLE OF CONGRESS AND THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
IN THE EXCLUSION OF ALIENS
It has become accepted constitutional doctrine that the power to control
immigration is vested in Congress. The source of this power has been held to be:

(491)
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(1) the "inherent power" of the United States as a sovereign nation1 and (2) the
constitutional provision authorizing Congress to regulate commerce with foreign
nations. 2 As to the latter, doubts were early expressed as to whether "commerce"
as envisaged by the framers of the Constitution encompassed immigration,3 and, once
conceding that it did, 4 whether immigration was that type of commerce which
demanded "one uniform system or plan of regulation" as set out in Cooley v. Board
of Wardens,5 so that its control would necessarily be the sole perogative of Congress. 6
This too was answered affirmatively,7 and the proposition that control over immigration is within the exclusive domain of Congress is today no longer open to question.8
Thus Congress, in the exercise of its power, may exclude aliens altogetherD or
prescribe terms and conditions upon which they may enter' 0 or remain in"1 the
United States. Aliens may be excluded for any reason.12 Congress, through quota
laws, the first of which was enacted in 1921,'3 has excluded aliens on the sole basis of
number, without regard to individual merit or qualification. The power to exclude
aliens is a power which affects international relations, and thus is vested in the

1. Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149
U.S. 698 (1893); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892); Chae Chan
Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
2. "The Congress shall have Power . . .To regulate commerce with foreign
nations . . ." U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580 (1884);
People of New York v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 107 U.S. 59 (1883);
Henderson v. Wickham, 92 U.S. 259 (1875); The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.)
283 (1849).
3. City of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837).
4. Henderson v. Wickham, supra note 2.
5. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
6. Henderson v. Wickham, supra note 2.
7. People of New York v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, supra note 2.
8. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954); Lloyd Sabaudo Societa Anonima Per
Azioni v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329 (1932); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923).
9. United States ex rel. Polymers v. Trudell, 284 U.S. 279 (1932); United States
v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905); Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903); Fok Young
Yo v. United States, 185 U.S. 296 (1902); Li Sing v. United States, 180 U.S. 486
(1901); Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538 (1895); Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, supra note 1; Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, supra, note 1; Chae
Chan Ping v. United States, supra note 1.
10. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950); United
States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, 289 U.S. 422 (1933); Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v.
Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909); United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S.
279 (1904).
11. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924);
Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585
(1913); Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272 (1912); Low Walh Suey v. Backus, 225 U.S.
460 (1912); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896); Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
12. Galvan v. Press, supra note 8 (communist); Hansen v. Haff, 291 U.S. 559
(1934) (immoral person); United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, supra note 10
(criminal); Bugajewitz v. Adams, supra note 11 (prostitute); Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, supra note 10 (diseased person); United States ex rel. Turner
v. Williams, supra note 10 (anarchist); United States v. Craig, 28 Fed. 795 (E.D.
Mich. 1886) (contract laborers).
13. Act of May 19, 1921, c. 8, 42 STAT. 5.
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political departments of government.14 It is to be exercised by treaty or act of
Congress, and carried out by the executive authority according to the regulations
established. 15
The admission of aliens into the United States is one of several matters dealt with
in the current comprehensive federal statute, the "Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952."'16 The act defines an "alien" as any person not a citizen or national of the
United States.17 A national of the United States is defined as "(A) a citizen of the
United States, or (B) a person who, though not a citizen of the United States, owes
permanent allegiance to the United States."' 8 Thus any person who is neither a
United States citizen nor one who owes permanent allegiance to this nation comes
under the scope of the term "alien." Aliens desiring to enter the United States are
grouped into two basic categories, immigrants and nonimmigrants.19 The immigrant
class is composed generally of those who seek permanent residence in the United
States and who may, if they so desire, and if they meet statutory qualifications,
become citizens of the United States.20 The immigrant class is itself subdivided into
two groups, quota immigrants 2 1 (those subject to numerical limitations) 22 and
nonquota immigrants 23 (those who may enter without regard to numerical limitations). Only a restricted number of quota immigrants may enter the United States
each year. Under the quota system, a certain maximum number is proclaimed
annually for each "quota area"24 and only that number of immigrant visas can be
issued to quota immigrants chargeable to that area. 25 There are preferred groups
which take precedence within the quota allotments. These groups are composed of
educated technicians and skilled specialists, their wives and families, parents of adult
United States citizens and wives and children of lawfully admitted aliens.28 Nonquota
immigrants include spouses or children of United States citizens, returning alien
residents, natives of independent Western Hemisphere nations, former United States
citizens who are qualified to reapply for citizenship, certain ministers of religious
denominations and active or retired United States alien employees. 2T
Nonimmnigrants are those who desire to spend a limited or unlimited period of
time in the United States but do not contemplate,, and are not entitled to, United

14. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, supra note 11.
15. Ibid.
16. McCarran-Walter Act, c. 477, 66 STAT. 163 (1952), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503
(1953).
17. 66 STAT. 166 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (3) (1953).
18. 66 STAT. 169 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (22) (1953).
19. 66 STAT. 167 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (15) (1953).
20. Besterman, Commentary of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.CA.,
Aliens & Nationality 18 (1953).
21. 66 STAT. 170 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (32) (1953).
22. 66 STAT. 176 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(c) (1953).
23. 66 STAT. 169 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 101(a) (27) (1953).
24. 66 STAT. 175-76 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(a) -(b) (1953).
25. 66. STAT. 176 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(c) (1953).26. 66 STAT. 178 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (a) (1)- (3) 1953).
27. 66 STAT. 169-70 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (27) (A) - (G) (1953).
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Included in this group are ambassadors and similar diplomats

accredited by foreign governments recognized de jure by the United States, other
officials and employees of those governments admitted on the basis of "reciprocity,"
and the attendants, servants and immediate families of these two groups, visiting
foreign businessmen and vacationers, aliens in transit through the United States,
alien seamen and airmen, treaty traders, students, United Nations and other world
organization officials, skilled persons coming for special purposes and foreign
2 9

newsmen.

Only those aliens who meet the requirements for admission to this nation are
permitted to enter. It must be observed however that not every border-crossing is an
30
It has been held that an alien does
"entry" as contemplated by the existing law.
not make an "entry" upon his return to this nation from a foreign country when he
3
had no intent to leave the United States. 1 Neither is there an "entry" when an
32
individual returns to the United States after having been removed involuntarily.

Any alien seeking to enter the United States must, unless he qualifies under
85
34
33
Visas are issued by
and passport
have an unexpired visa
counsular officers of the United States.36 Certain classes of aliens are ineligible to
certain exceptions,

receive visas, hence are precluded from entryY'

The ineligible types include those

28. Besterman, supra note 20, at 18.
29. 66 STAT. 167-69 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (15) (A) -(1) (1953).
30. 66 STAT. 167 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § ll01a (13) (1953).
31. Di Pasquale v. Karnuth, 158 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1947). In this case, the alien
went by sleeping car from Buffalo, N. Y., to Detroit, Mich., the route being through
Canada. The alien failed to inquire as to the route when he boarded the train and
was asleep during the trip through Canada. Held: No "entry" was made when he
arrived at Detroit. The court, L. Hand, J., refused to follow Ward v. De Barros,
75 F.2d 34 (1st Cir. 1935) in which, under similar facts, the court determined that
an entry was made when the alien re-crossed the United States border. An entry
was also held to have been made when an alien returned to the United States after
being forced by the shipwreck of an American fishing vessel to spend ten days
on Mexican soil, Taguchi v. Carr, 62 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1932); when an alien, en
route to Detroit from New York City, knowingly passed through Canada, even though
he did not leave the train, Zurbrick v. Borg, 47 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1931); and when
an alien seaman, after shipping out from New York City, landed in foreign ports
before returning to the United States, United States ex rel. Claussen v. Day, 279
U.S. 398 (1929) (dictum to the effect that, had alien not set foot on foreign soil, his
return to the United States would not have been an entry).
32. Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388 (1947).
33. 8 C.F.R. §§ 211.2 (immigrant), 212.3 (nonimmigrant) (1953).
34. 8 C.F.R. §§ 211.1 (immigrant), 212.1 (nonimmigrant) (1953). Unfortunately
neither the United States code nor the code of Federal Regulations defines the term
"visa." In BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 1743 (4th ed. 1951), a visa is defined as "an
official endorsement upon a document, passport, commercial book, etc., to certify
that it has been examined and found correct or in due form."
35. See note 34 supra. In 66 STAT. 170 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (30) (1953) a
passport is defined as "any travel document issued by competent authority showing
the bearer's origin, identity, and nationality if any, which is valid for the entry of
the bearer into a foreign country."
36. 66 STAT. 191 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1953).
37. 66 STAT. 182-87 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1953).
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who are feeble-minded or insane, psychopaths, epileptics, drug addicts, chronic
alcoholics, tuberculars, lepers, paupers, beggars and vagrants, criminals (other than
political offenders), polygamists, prostitutes, laborers for which there is no demand,
those likely to become public charges, stowaways, illiterates, anarchists, communists
and others. 3 8 The fact that an alien has obtained a visa is no assurance that he -will
be permitted to enter. All aliens must present themselves at United States ports,39
40
4
or airports of entry, 1 and, while there, undergo physical and mental examinations
42
They
admistered by medical officers of the United States Public Health Service.
are also investigated to determine whether or not they fulfill the other requirements
(such as quota, status, classification) and to ascertain that they do not fall into any
43
These inquiries are conducted by officers of
of the excludable classes set out above.
the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice, or by an
44
If the medical
officer of the United States designated by the Attorney General.
report discloses findings sufficient to preclude the alien from admission he can have
45
those findings reviewed by a board of medical officers of the Public Health Service.
Findings and rulings of immigration officers are reviewable by the Commissioner of
Immigration and Naturalization, district directors of the Service, special inquiry

officers, the Assistant Commissioner of the Inspections and Examinations Division
of the Service, the Board of Immigration Appeals of the Attorney General's office and
46
The various procedural requirements as to what
by the Attorney General himself.
types of rulings can be appealed and to which appellate agency they are referred are
extensive 47 and no useful purpose can here be served by exploring them in detail.
48
Suffice it to say that the
They are fully set out in the Code of Federal Regulations.

Attorney General has authority to make the final administrative decision in any
49
particular case if he chooses to do so.
When an alien has been excluded by administrative officials and has exhausted
the administrative appellate process in vain, a problem arises as to whether, and
to what extent, he can obtain judicial review of the proceedings in federal tribunals.
50
The alien arrived
A pioneer case in this area is Nishimura Ekiu v. United States.
at the port of San Francisco and was denied entry by the Commissioner because of

38. Ibid.
39. 8 C.F.R. § 231.6 (1953) establishes 391 ports of entry for aliens, organized
into 15 districts. These ports are of three types: "A" (which handles all types of
aliens), "B" (which handles only aliens who, under certain exceptions set out in
8 C.F.R. §§ 211-12 (1953), do not need visas but only "border-crossing identification
cards"), and "C" (which handles only alien seamen and airmen).
40. 8 C.F.R. § 231.7 (1953) establishes 57 airports of entry.
41. 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(a) (1953).
42. 66 STAT. 198 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1224 (1953).
43. 66 STAT. 198 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a) (1953).
44. Ibid.
45. See note 42 supra.

46. 8 C.F.R. §§ 235-36 (1953); 66 STAT. 173 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (1953).
47. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 6-8, 235-36 (1953).
48.
49.
50.

Ibid.
66 STAT. 200 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 126(c) (1953).
142 U.S. 651 (1892).
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failure to meet requirements under the existing immigration statute.51 She sued out
a 'writ of habeas corpus, claiming that she was being unlawfully detained. Relief was
denied by the circuit court and the Supreme Court affirmed on the ground that the
question of her right to land had been determined by a duly constituted and competent
tribunal (the commissioner) having jurisdiction over the matter, and that the decision
was not judicially reviewable. Mr. Justice Gray, writing for the majority, 52 intimated
that "due process of law"6 3 may assume a different form when applied to an alien
seeking entry into the United States than when applied to an individual already
within the United States. He stated:
An alien immigrant, prevented from landing by any ...officer claiming
authority to do so . . . and thereby restrained of his liberty, is doubtless
entitled to a writ of habeas corpus to ascertain whether the restraint is
lawfuL 54
... Congress may, if it sees fit... authorize the courts to investigate and
ascertain the facts on which the right to land depends. But, on the other
hand, the final determination of those facts may be entrusted by Congress to
executive officers; and in such a case ... he is made the sole and exclusive
judge of the existence of those facts, and no other tribunal, unless expressly
authorized by law.., is at liberty to re-examine . .. the sufficiency of the
evidence on which he acted.... As to such persons [alien immigrants] the
decisions of executive or administrative officers, acting within powers
expressly conferred by Congress, are due process of law. 55

Thus this early case limits the scope of judicial review in exclusion cases to questions
of jurisdiction and authority, and if these matters are resolved in favor of the
administrative official no inquiry into the merits of his decision is permitted. The
notion that due process of law, in regard to alien immigrants, is whatever Congress
chooses to make it has been reasserted in later cases.58
This same type of problem was presented in Gegiouw v. Uhl 57 The objection was
not as to the correctness of the administrative officer's decision on a question of fact,
but whether or not in making that decision he had exceeded his authority. Mr.
Justice Holmes speaking for the Court, stated that where the statute provided that
decisions of immigration officials were to be "conclusive:' the courts had no prerogative to review rulings on questions of fact. However, where the decision of the official

51. Act of August 3, 1882, c. 376, 22 STAT. 214.
52. Mr. Justice Brewer dissented without opinion.
be deprived of life,
53. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V (".... nor shall any person ..
liberty, or property, without due process of law ... ").
54. 142 U.S. at 660, citing Lau Ou Bew, Petitioner,.141 U.S. 583 (1891); Wan
Shing v. United States, 140 U.S. 424 (1891); United States v. Jung Ah Lung, 124
U.S. 621 (1888); Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536 (1884).
55. 142 U.S. at 660.
56. Shaughnessy v. United States, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); United States ex rel.
Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950); United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253
(1905).
57. 239 US. 3 (1915).
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was attacked as an error of law (here that he was exceeding his authority) the
question could properly be brought before the court.6s
Another problem involved in this area is whether or not an alien immigrant is
entitled to an administrative hearing, in which he can challenge the government's
evidence and rulings, or whether he is obliged to accept administrative orders as
final without any opportunity to challenge. In a 1950 case, United States ex rel.
Kmauf- v. Shaughnessy,59 the Supreme Court affirmed a ruling by the Attorney
General excluding a native of Germany who sought to enter the United States under
the War Brides Act of 1945.60 The ruling was predicated on the Attorney Generals
authority to exclude certain classes of individuals if he found that their entry would
be prejudicial to the public interest. 6 1 The exclusion order was issued without a
hearing, which, under wartime security regulations, was permissible if the Attorney
General determined that the basis of the order was confidential information, the disclosure of which would be prejudicial to the public interest. 62 In an opinion by Mr.
Justice Minton it is stated:
...it is not within the province of any court, unless expressly authorized
by law, to review the determination of the political branch of the Government
to exclude a given alien. 63
Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far
64
as an alien denied entry is concerned.
The application of this decision was limited in a 1953 case, Kwong Hai Chew V.
Colding, 65 in which the Court held that the regulations which permitted denial of a
hearing in the Krauff case did not apply where the alien was a lawful permanent
resident of the United States seeking re-entry after serving as chief steward on a
vessel of the American registry. The Court, distinguishing the Knauff case, pointed
out that if an alien is a lawful resident of the United States, the fifth amendment66
protects him against deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of law.

58. The Acting Commissioner of Immigration excluded a group of illiterate
Russian laborers on the ground that they were "likely to become public charges,"
a basis for exclusion under the existing statute, 34 STAT. 898, 899 (1907) as amended
by 36 STAT. 263 (1910). He based this ruling on the fact that the laborers' destination
was Portland, Oregon, where conditions were such that they would be unable to
find employment. The Supreme Court reversed the order, pointing out that the
immigration statute dealt with admission to the United States as a whole, not just
Portland. This being true the Acting Commissioner exceeded his 'authority in
decreeing that the labor market of the United States was such that the alien immigrants would likely become public charges.
59. Supra note 56.
60. c. 591, 59 SmT. 695 (1945). This act expired on December 28, 1948, subsequent to the time that petitioner first applied for admission (August 14, 1948).
61. 8 C.F.R. § 17553(a)-(h) 1943).
62. 8 C.F.R. § 175.57(b) (1943).
63. 338 U.S. at 543.
64. Id. at 544.
65. 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
66. U.S. Coxer. amend. V.
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He is thus entitled to notice and hearing, at least before an administrative tribunal.07
In light of this holding it would appear that once an alien has been a lawful resident
of- the United States, he may leave this country and, upon seeking to return, is
entitled at least to an administrative hearing, and cannot, like a nonresident alien in
certain instances, be excluded by the Attorney General without disclosure of the
information upon which the order is predicated.
It will be observed that all of these cases have dealt with a situation in which the
individual seeking admission to the United States was concededly an alien, and made
no claim to United States citizenship. In United States v. Ju Toy, 68 the petitioner
asserted that he was a native born citizen of the United States, returning after a
temporary departure. He was allowed an administrative hearing and was denied
permission to enter. Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court, held that a fair
hearing is essential where a alien seeking entry claims citizenship, but that the
hearing may be administrative, and need not be judicial. Later decisions appear to
support the rule that where the individual seeking to enter the United States claims
citizenship the requirements of due process are satisfied by an administrative hearing,
provided that such hearing is "fair."0 9
From a consideration of these cases, certain general principles become discernible
which seem to have met with approval in the Supreme Court:
(1) Due process of law, when applied to a nonresident alien seeking admission
to the United States, may and usually does assume a different form than that
applicable to residents of the United States. This form can be whatever Congress
chooses to make it.
(2) While certain classes of aliens may be excluded without the necessity of a
hearing, yet when an alien claims to be a citizen of the United States he is entitled at
least to an administrative hearing conducted in a fair and impartial manner.
(3) Although no alien has the right to have the administrative proceedings in
which he was ordered excluded judicially reviewed on the merits, yet he may bring
habeas corpus proceedings on the question whether or not he is being unlawfully
deprived of his liberty. The court will decide only if the order restraining him was
issued by an authorized official pursuant to applicable procedural requirements, and
will not inquire into the soundness of the decision itself.
But for a recent decision involving the application of the Administrative Procedure Act 70 in this area, these principles would appear to be recognized up to the
present time. However in Brownell v. Tom We Shung7 1 the Court appeared to

67.
68.
69.
253 U.S.
70.
71.

344 U.S. at 596-97.
198 U.S. 253 (1905).
Quon Quon Poy v. Johnson, 273 U.S. 352 (1927); Kwock Jan Fat v. White,
'454 (1920); Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8 (1908).
c. 324, 60 STAT. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1952).
352 U.S. 180 (1956).
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enlarge the scope of judicial review in exclusion proceedings. The petitioner, a
Chinese alien, claimed admission to the United States under provisions of the War
Bride Act of 1945,72 testifying under oath that he was the blood son of an American
citizen. After repeated failures before administrative officials, petitioner sought a
73
declaratory judgment pursuant to section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act.
The government contended that general judicial review was precluded in exclusion
cases. However, the Court, through Mr. Justice Clark, stated without citing authority:
Admittedly excluded aliens may test the order of their exclusion by
habeas corpus.

74

It will be observed that it was "the order" which the Court said could be tested, and
not merely the authority of the official to issue the order, which would appear to be
the traditional view. The holding in this case presumably would permit all exclusion
orders to be judicially reviewed-a concept wholly foreign to the seemingly wellsettled practice. Once establishing the premise that general judicial review of
exclusion orders could be obtained by habeas corpus the Court then reasoned that it
should also be obtainable through declaratory judgments, since
of the parties requires
We do not believe that the constitutional status
7 5
that the form of judicial action be strait-jacketed.
It was emphasized that such a conclusion was consistent with the 1955 case
7 6
which involved judicial review of an administrative
of Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro,
order commanding the deportation of a resident alien under certain provisions of
78
through Mr.
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.77 A divided court,
Justice Black, held that the legality of such an order could be tested by declaratory
7 9
It was
judgment pursuant to section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act.
pointed out that the purpose of the Administrative Procedure Act was "to remove
80
and that since an individual had to
obstacles to judicial review of agency action,"
be in custody in order to obtain review by habeas corpus, it would be inconsistent

with the intent of Congress to permit review only in this manner. Such a rule would
require any alien ordered deported to go to jail in order to obtain judicial review
of the order. The Court reasoned that this was an obstacle which Congress intended
to remove, and held that by virtue of the Administrative Procedure Act declaratory
judgments should be permissible means of reviewing deportation orders.
In deciding the Pedreiro case the Court was troubled with the 1953 decision in
Heikkila v. Barber,S1 which held that a deportation order issued under section 22

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
(1953).
78.
79.
80.
81.

See note 60 supra.
60 STAT. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1952).
352 U.S. at 183.
Ibid.
349 U.S. 48 (1955).
McCarran-Walter Act, c. 477, 66 STAT. 163 (1952), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503
Justices
60 STAT.
349 U.S.
345 U.S.

Minton, Reed and Burton dissented.
243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1952).
at 51.
229 (1953).
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of the Internal Security Act of 195082 (making Communist party membership per se
ground for deportation) was reviewable only by habeas corpus. This holding was
based on section 19 (a) of the Immigration Act of 191783 which made the Attorney
General's decision in deportation cases "final." It should be emphasized that the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 195284 had not been enacted at the time that
the petitioner began his action, as the Court in both the Pedreiro85 and Heikkle 8 6
cases was careful to point out. The petitioner in this latter case sought "review of
agency action" as well as injunctive and declaratory relief, 87 relying on section 10
of the Administrative Procedure Act. 88 This section provides for judicial review of
agency action unless the particular statute involved precludes judicial review. 89
Because the traditional form of judicial review under the 1917 statute had been by
habeas corpus the Court decided that the statute was one which came under the
exception, and any type of review other than by habeas corpus was precluded.
When the Pedreiro case came before the Court, the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952 had replaced the Immigration Act of 1917. A different provision of the
Administrative Procedure Act, section 12, became applicable. It provides:
No subsequent legislation shall be held to supersede or modify ... this
Act except to the extent that such legislation shall do so expressly. 90
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, being "subsequent legislation" (the
Administrative Procedure Act was passed in 1946) was dearly subject to this provision. Since section 10(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act 1 specifically
enumerated declaratory judgments as a proper form of action, and since the Court
could find nothing in the new immigration act which "superseded or modified"
section 10(b), the Court held that a declaratory judgment was a proper remedy in
securing judicial review of deportation orders. The fact that the 1952 act contained
a provision making the administrative action "final" when reviewed by the Attorney
General made it necessary for the Court to draw a distinction between the use
of that term in the 1917 act and its use in the 1952 act 9 2 This the Court was able

82. 64 STAT. 1006 (1950).
83. 39 STAT. 889 (1917) as amended by 54 STAT. 1238 (1940) ("in every case
where any person is ordered deported from the United States under provisions of
this Act, or of any law or treaty, the decision of the Attorney General shall be final").
84. Supra note 77.
85. 349 U.S. at 50.
86. 345 U.S. at 232 n.4.
87. Id. at 230.
88. 60 STAT. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1952).
89. IbiLd.
90. 60 STAT. 244 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1011 (1952).
91. 60 STAT.243 (1946), 5 US.C. § 1009(b) (1952).
92. In Heikkila v. Barber, supna note 81, the Court pointed out that "final" as
used in immigration legislation has a history, both in the statutes and in court
decisions. It began with § 8 of the Immigration Act of 1891, 26 STAT. 1085, Which
provided that decisions of inspection officers should be final unless appeal was
taken to the superintendent of immigration, whose action was subject to review by
the Secretary of the Treasury. In Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651
(1892), the Court held that by virtue of this provision Congress had entrusted the
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to do; thus the finality provision in the 1952 act was no deterrent to the application
of the Administrative Procedure Act.
With the declaratory judgment now a proper proceeding for judicial review of
exclusion orders the problem arises whether or not the traditional scope of review
in these matters has been enlarged. As has been previously emphasized, the Court
in the Tom We Shung case asserted that aliens could test "the order" of their
exclusion by habeas corpus. If "the order," as the Court spoke of it, encompassed
not only questions involving authority and procedure (the only issues open to judicial inquiry under the Ekiu rule) but also review as to the correctness of the
administrative decisions on substantive matters, then the Tom We Shung case has
expanded the scope of judicial review in exclusion cases. Whether or not the Court
intended to arrive at this result is open to conjecture. The only question before
the Court was whether the petitioner had used the proper procedural steps to obtain
judicial review. After deciding this issue in his favor the Court did not have to
determine whether the use of this form of action permitted by section 10(b) of the
Administrative Procedure Act93 carried with it the comprehensive judicial review
specified in section 10(e) of that act.94
A lower federal court in a case subsequent to the Tom We Shung decision
apparently did not feel that judicial review of an exclusion order on the merits was
yet available. In Forbes v. Brownell9 5 a British subject seeking to enter the United
States was excluded from admission on grounds that the crime of bigamy, for which
he was convicted in Canada, was a crime involving "moral turpitude," which is a
basis for exclusion under the 1952 act. 96 The petitioner brought an action for
declaratory judgment under section 10(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act.97
The District Court for the District of Columbia held that it could not inquire whether
the petitioner was guilty or innocent, and that the facts leading to his conviction

final determination of the facts in exclusion cases to administrative officers, and
held that this was not a denial of due process in regard to an alien seeking admission
to the United States. The Court in the Heiklila case asserted that this same construction was applied in cases involving deportation orders. 345 U.S. at 234-35.
Thus reading § 19 of the 1917 Immigration Act against this background the Court
said that Congress intended to preclude judicial intervention in deportation cases
to the fullest extent permitted by the Constitution. This being true, the first exception of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 STAT. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (1952),
preventing application of the act where statutes preclude judicial review, was
applicable and the act could not be brought into play. In Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro,
349 U.S. 48 (1955), the Court said that there was some ambigunity in the provision
in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 STAT. 200, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
(1953) giving the Attorney General the power to make the "final" determination in
any proceeding if he chooses to do so. The Court said, "It is more in harmony with
the generous review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act to construe the
word 'final' . . . as referring to finality in the administrative procedure rather than
as cutting off the right of judicial review in whole or in part." 349 U.S. at 51.
93. Supra note 91.
94. 60 STAT. 245 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e) (5) (1952).
95. 149 F. Supp. 848 (D.C. 1957).
96. 66 STAT. 182 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a) (9) (1953).
97. Supra note 91.
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were not open to judicial evaluation. The court held that it could decide only
whether the crime of bigamy in Canada was one which involved moral turpitude.
Admittedly the Administrative Procedure Act provides a basis for a more comprehensive judicial review of administrative determinations in this area. Section
10(a) states:
Any person suffering legal wrong because of any agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by such action ... shall be entitled to judicial
review thereof.9 8
Conceding that any alien denied permission to enter the United States would be
"adversely affected" or "aggrieved" it would appear that the act authorizes judicial
review whether or not he has suffered any legal wrong. This, it seems, makes every
exclusion order subject to judicial review. If this is a proper analysis of the act
then it in fact enlarges the customary scope of review, at least to the extent of
determining whether or not the administrative decision was supported by "substantial evidence," 99 a matter which was not considered in the original procedure
as set out in the Ekiu case. Whether the decision in the Tom We Shung case has
extended the scope of judicial review in exclusion cases past its customary perimeter
cannot now be asserted with any degree of certainty. At least one federal court has
thought not. However the broad provisions of section 10 of the Administrative
Procedure Act provide a strong argument to the contrary.
JoHN CHARLMS CROw

98.
99.

60 STAT. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (a) (1952).
See note 94 supra.
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